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No More Excuses 
A CASE FOR THE IRS’S FULL COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT  
INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the only federal 
agency in the United States that has the legal right to take 
your money first, and then defend its right to the appropriation 
later.1 The power of the IRS is tremendous. However, it is also 
the agency whose laws are the hardest to challenge because of 
its countless, ever-changing rules, regulations, and 
pronouncements.2 It is no wonder that the public has such 
disdain for the IRS.3 
This is unfortunate. The IRS serves the most 
fundamental role in America’s democratic system of 
government—collection of revenue through taxation.4 Without 
it, there would be no government.5 Funds collected through 
taxation, for instance, are used to finance the various federal 
agencies of the executive branch and their projects.6 Therefore, 
  
 1 See 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (2006); see also Brian v. Gugin, 853 F. Supp. 358, 361 
(D. Idaho 1994). 
 2 See Chris Edwards, Income Tax Rife with Complexity and Inefficiency, CATO 
INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. (Apr. 2006), http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0604-33.pdf. 
 3 Kevin Boully, Take Advantage of Public Opinion: The SEC Is the Lowest Rated 
Agency, LITIG. POSTSCRIPT (May 20, 2009), http://www.litigationps.com/litigation_postscript_ 
per/2009/05/take-advantage-of-public-opinion-the-sec-is-the-lowest-rated-agency.html 
(although the SEC was the lowest-rated agency following various scandals and 
oversights, the IRS came in at a close second and was cited as “the always-hated 
Internal Revenue Service”). 
 4 See Fact Sheet on Writing & Enacting Tax Legislation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/writing.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2010). 
 5 Some might argue, as critics of big government do, that this is a good thing. 
But realistically speaking, we need some form of centralized government to ensure order 
and security. We agree to taxation in return for representation. Recall the famous outcry, 
“No taxation without representation.” Britain, America, and the 1765 Stamp Act: An 
Exhibition by the Parliamentary Archives, U. K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament. 
uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/parliamentary_archives/archives___stamp_
act.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2010). 
 6 The largest amount of tax revenue is allocated to the Department of Health 
and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Department of Defense—Military, 
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it is important for citizens to trust the IRS and cooperate in 
helping it execute this important role. 
But how can the government accomplish this goal when 
people have disliked the IRS for so long? The answer is 
transparency and accountability—particularly through 
adherence to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7 The 
root of the problem appears to be the unbridled power of the 
IRS.8 People fear and dislike the IRS because they feel 
powerless against it. In Cohen v. United States,9 the majority 
even joked, “A fool and his money are soon parted. It takes 
creative tax laws for the rest,”10 and applied the quote to the 
IRS’s “aggressive interpretation of the tax code.”11 
Congress’s power of taxation is remarkable. The Sixteenth 
Amendment gives Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several states, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.”12 Additionally, the definition of “income” has been 
interpreted expansively: “Gross income means all income from 
whatever source derived, unless excluded by law . . . [and] 
includes income realized in any form, whether in money, 
property, or services.”13 Then, adding on to that broad taxing 
power, the Treasury interprets the tax laws with great flexibility, 
including issuing binding regulations without adhering to formal 
rulemaking procedures pursuant to the APA.14 
  
and Department of the Treasury. See A. Moore & A. Moah, The Tax Breakdown Project 
2008, TAXBREAKDOWN.ORG, http://www.taxbreakdown.org (last visited July 11, 2010). 
 7 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp. 
IV 2004). 
 8 See generally Byron York, Health Care Reform Means More Power for the 
IRS, THE WASH. EXAMINER, Sept. 2, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonexaminer. 
com/politics/Health-care-reform-means-more-power-for-the-IRS-56781377.html (“Under 
the Democrats’ health care proposals, the already powerful—and already feared—IRS 
would wield even more power and extend its reach even farther into the lives of ordinary 
Americans . . . .”). 
 9 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also infra Part III.A. 
 10 Cohen, 578 F.3d at 3 (quoting comic strip writer Bob Thaves) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 11 See id. 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 13 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1954); see also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 
334 (1940); Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); 
Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 (1925); 
Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (explaining that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has “frequently stated that this broad all-inclusive language was used 
by Congress to exert the full measure of its taxing power under the Sixteenth 
Amendment”) (citing Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955)). 
 14 See infra Part III.B. The IRS publishes official documents that help 
taxpayers apply the law to their unique situations. These documents include revenue 
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However, if a taxpayer wants to challenge the IRS’s 
appropriation of his or her funds and seek a refund, that 
taxpayer must pass myriad procedural hurdles, including 
forms and deadlines.15 And if the case winds up in litigation, it 
is the agency’s own interpretations found in Treasury 
regulations and revenue rulings and procedures that are 
provided as precedent,16 thereby lessening the chances of a 
refund even more. Thus, the IRS has the power to affect 
taxpayers’ rights and obligations almost freely and at the same 
time restrict their access to a remedy. 
This result goes against all notions of fairness and due 
process. Separation of powers is one of the most fundamental 
principles of our democratic system of government—it protects 
citizens against the accumulation of too much power in any one 
branch of government.17 However, when you have an 
independent agency like the IRS that has power to pass 
binding law and adjudicate matters in its own right, and whose 
members are secure in their jobs with no need to please the 
public in order to remain there,18 the potential for abuse is sky-
high and the need for regulation is imperative. However, as 
will be discussed, the IRS has failed to comply with the 
regulatory scheme that Congress established to monitor 
administrative actions.19 This raised some concern in the past, 
but it was not until recently, when the D.C. Circuit decided 
Cohen v. United States, that the IRS’s lack of full compliance 
with the APA became even more problematic.20 
  
rulings, revenue procedures, and notices. The Commissioner of the IRS also proposes 
regulations to the Treasury, which must get its approval before assuming the force of 
law. There are three types of Treasury regulations: proposed, temporary, or final. Only 
final and temporary regulations are binding as law, although temporary regulations 
expire after three years. Proposed regulations are not binding authority. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7805(e) (2006); Internal Revenue Bulletins, Guide to Understanding the Differences 
Among Official IRS Documents, UNCLEFED.COM, http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-Bulls/ 
OfficialDocsExp.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2010); see also Internal Revenue Serv., 
Understanding IRS Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/ 
0,,id=101102,00.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2003). 
 15 See Internal Revenue Serv., Collection Appeal Rights, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1660.pdf (last updated Mar. 4, 2010). 
 16 See Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Code, Regulations, and Official Guidance, 
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=98137,00.html (last updated Nov. 12, 
2010) (“Rulings and procedures reported in the [Internal Revenue Bulletins] do not have 
the force and effect of Treasury tax regulations, but they may be used as precedents.”). 
 17 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 18 See KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
68 (4th ed. 2004). 
 19 See infra Part III.B. 
 20 See infra Part III.A. 
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This note will discuss Cohen v. United States, as well as 
other factors and developments that support the case for the 
IRS’s full compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Part I of this note describes the APA, its purpose, and some 
relevant provisions. Part II discusses the IRS, its rulemaking 
procedures, and its lack of compliance with the APA. Part III 
discusses the various reasons why it is in the IRS’s best 
interests to comply with the APA: (a) Cohen v. United States 
might have opened the door for greater judicial review of IRS 
rulemaking, increasing the chances of a rule being invalidated; 
(b) compliance will help ensure deference in court proceedings, 
thereby saving the IRS the time and money it would have to 
spend defending reasons for a rule’s receiving deference from 
the courts; (c) it supports the IRS’s mission to focus on the 
taxpayers and will thus help the IRS meet its tax gap reduction 
goals in an efficient way; and (d) it upholds the integrity of the 
rule of law by supporting a democratic legislative process, 
thereby protecting taxpayer interests and increasing their 
confidence in the system. Part IV concludes the note by 
recognizing that, although it is not certain that courts will 
expand their judicial review of IRS rulemaking, it is clear that 
there are many other factors supporting the case for the IRS’s 
full compliance with the APA. 
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
The administrative state was not born with the creation 
of American government. In fact, America actually opposed the 
“gradual development of a more concentrated, specialized, and 
penetrating state apparatus in Britain”21—some even believing 
that this was one cause of the American Revolution.22 Instead, 
the administrative state developed over time;23 and while there 
are differing interpretations of the development process,24 it can 
be agreed that the administrative state evolved in response to 
“the growing need for vesting in a public authority supervision 
  
 21 STEVEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION 
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982), reprinted in PETER H. 
SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (1994).  
 22 Id. 
 23 SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 31.  
 24 See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); 
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982); James 
Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INT. 77 (1975). 
2011] NO MORE EXCUSES 841 
over the economic integrity of industries.”25 It was likewise a 
way to fill the gaps made by the deficiencies of the judiciary 
and the legislature.26 
However, with the expansion of administrative agencies 
came criticism and calls for regulation,27 as such agencies had 
the potential to infringe on fundamental due process rights.28 
The Administrative Procedure Act was the government’s 
answer to such concerns.29 This section will explain the purpose 
of the Administrative Procedure Act and set out its relevant 
provisions as they relate to the IRS’s rulemaking authority. 
A. Purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act 
The Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946 
to promote “fair play and equal rights under the law” in 
keeping with the “tripartite form of our democracy.”30 It was 
directly aimed at restraining the growing power of 
administrative agencies in America’s governmental structure 
because the potential for abuse of that power was palpable.31 
Prior to the enactment of the APA, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s Committee on Administrative Management 
described administrative agencies as “miniature independent 
governments set up to deal with [various problems],” stating 
that they “constitute a headless ‘fourth branch’ of the 
Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and 
uncoordinated powers.”32 In essence, they are a fusion of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers.33 In supporting the 
  
 25 JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938), reprinted in SCHUCK, 
supra note 21, at 14. 
 26 Id. at 16. 
 27 See ROBERT RABIN, FEDERAL REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(1986), reprinted in SCHUCK, supra note 21, at 41. 
 28 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
 29 RABIN, supra note 27, at 41. 
 30 COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79th CONG., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 1944-46, at III (1946) [hereinafter APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
 31 Id. at 350 (Statesman Elihu Root said, “Yet the powers that are committed 
to these regulating agencies, and which they must have to do their work, carry with 
them great and dangerous opportunities of oppression and wrong. If we are to continue 
a government of limited powers these agencies of regulation must themselves be 
regulated.”). 
 32 Id. at 189 (quoting Report of President’s Committee on Administrative 
Management). 
 33 See STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (4th ed. 2006) (“In the modern, 
complex, postindustrial world, policies are initiated, formulated, promulgated, and 
modified by technocratic experts who hold mid- to high-level positions in America’s 
bureaucracies (federal, state, and local). The same agencies that make the policies also 
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passage of the Administrative Procedure Act to put a check on 
agency action, President Roosevelt cautioned that “[t]he 
practice of creating independent regulatory commissions, who 
perform administrative work in addition to judicial work, 
threatens to develop a ‘fourth branch’ of the Government for 
which there is no sanction in the Constitution.”34 The 
President’s Committee on Administrative Management added 
in its report that this “not only undermines judicial fairness; it 
weakens public confidence in that fairness.”35 
As pointed out by Representative Francis E. Walter of 
Pennsylvania, who was a member of the House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary during the 
enactment of the APA, “[administrative law] is administrative 
because it involves the exercise of legislative and judicial powers 
of government by officers who are neither legislators nor judges. 
It is law because what they do is binding upon the citizens 
exactly as statutes or judgments are binding.”36 In the traditional 
form of American government, the three interdependent 
branches take on separate roles, and each branch is monitored 
by the other branches through the system of checks and 
balances.37 Since agencies cannot be monitored in this way, it 
was essential that an alternate means of control be created.38 
Representative Walter explained that federal agencies 
engage in three different functions: legislative, judicial, and 
investigative.39 In order to put a check on those functions, the 
Act employs three different devices: public information, 
administrative operation, and judicial review.40 Most relevant 
  
implement them. Pursuant to implementing their own policies, agencies also investigate 
infractions of those policies and adjudicate those infractions. The agencies also impose 
sanctions. Although there may be academic squabbles over the degree of power that 
bureaucracies have acquired, there is virtually no disagreement over the fact that the old 
dichotomy between policy making and policy implementation is gone and that 
administrative agencies now perform both functions, fused into one institution.”). 
 34 APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 189. 
 35 Id. (quoting Report of President’s Committee on Administrative Management). 
 36 Id. at 349. 
 37 Checks and Balances, AMERICA.GOV (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.america. 
gov/st/usg-english/2008/January/20071116173344eaifas0.9917719.html. 
 38 See Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 271 (1986) (“In attempting to control administrative 
processes, the drafters of the APA responded to two quite general constitutional 
themes . . . . The first concerns the usurpation of government by powerful private 
groups. The second involves the danger of self-interested representation: the pursuit by 
political actors of interests that diverge from those of the citizenry.”). 
 39 APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 352-53.  
 40 See id. at 353. The APA’s public information section requires that agencies 
disclose information about their organizational structure and procedures, as well as 
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to this note is the legislative function of federal agencies, as 
concerned with the IRS’s rulemaking procedures. 
B. Relevant Provisions of the APA 
By means of introduction, Section 551(1) of the APA 
defines “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the 
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review 
by another agency,” and also provides exceptions, none of 
which include the IRS.41 The term “rule” is defined under 
Section 551(4) as “the whole or any part of any agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future 
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of any agency . . . .”42 A pronouncement is a rule 
“to the extent that . . . [it] formally prescribe[s] a course of 
conduct for the future rather than merely pronounce[s] existing 
rights or liabilities.”43 Thus, “[a]gencies are given discretion to 
dispense with notice (and consequently with public 
proceedings) in the case of interpretive rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice”44—all of which do not impose new “courses of 
conduct for the future.” 
Once it is established that an agency is subject to APA 
rulemaking requirements, the Act prescribes in Section 553 
procedures for promulgating rules.45 These procedures 
  
make public “substantive and interpretive rules which they have framed for the 
guidance of the public.” Id. The sections that deal with administrative operations 
require that agencies submit notices of proposed regulations and allow interested 
parties to submit comments in lieu of the traditional congressional hearing that would 
otherwise be held during the legislative process. Id. Those sections also outline the 
procedures for agency hearings and adjudications, and the limitations upon “penalties 
or relief which agencies may impose or confer in any case.” Id. at 354. Finally, the 
judicial review section “prescribes . . . when there may be judicial review and how far 
the courts may go in examining into a given case.” Id. 
 41 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006); see also APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
30, at 1, 354. 
 42 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
 43 APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 197. 
 44 Id. at 200; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 45 See CANN, supra note 33, at 293. Only substantive rules must go through 
the Section 553 rulemaking process, even though there are three types of rules: 
interpretive, procedural, and substantive. Id. at 294. However, all rules must be 
published in the Federal Register once adopted. Id. at 294-95. 
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“encourage public participation in the rulemaking process.”46 
They do this by requiring agencies to issue public notices of 
proposed regulations, collect public comments, and take those 
comments into consideration when finalizing the regulation.47 
The general procedures are as follows: Section 553(b) 
requires an agency to publish in the Federal Register a public 
notice of its proposed rulemaking.48 Next, Section 553(c) provides 
that the agency allow the public to submit comments on the 
proposed rule.49 Once the agency has collected the public’s 
remarks regarding the proposed rule, it takes that input into 
consideration and only then writes out the rule. The agency will 
also include a “concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and 
purpose,”50 which the courts will use to review the validity of the 
rule.51 The rule is then published in the Federal Register again, 
and only after thirty days does it become a final rule, binding the 
courts and the public.52 Final rules may not be promulgated 
without first being publicly proposed.53 
However, Section 553(b) provides exceptions to the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements of Section 553.54 
These exceptions include interpretive rules, procedural rules, 
policy statements, and good cause.55 Such items are excluded 
from notice-and-comment rulemaking because they do not 
dictate the future conduct of individuals, nor do they have the 
  
 46 Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s 
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2007). 
 47 Id. at 1732-33. 
 48 Id. at 1732 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)). 
 49 Id. at 1733. 
 50 CANN, supra note 33, at 293 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 51 Hickman, supra note 46, at 1733. 
 52 CANN, supra note 33, at 293. 
 53 Hickman, supra note 46, at 1732 (“[T]he courts generally do not allow 
agencies to promulgate final rules with provisions not ‘sufficiently foreshadowed’ by an 
NPRM.”). See id. at n.20 for cases and a treatise that discuss the “sufficiently 
foreshadowed” test. 
 54 Id. at 1734. 
 55 Id. Although these exceptions are available, all rules are still subject to 
publication and are open to challenge. Procedural and interpretive rules must be 
published in the Federal Register as soon as they are adopted. CANN, supra note 33, at 
294-95. Additionally, interested parties adversely affected by an interpretive rule have 
the opportunity to challenge the rule in an adjudicatory hearing before suffering the 
effects of that rule. Id. at 298. 
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effect of law.56 As discussed below, the IRS has used these 
exceptions to keep from complying with the APA.57 
II. THE IRS 
The IRS assumes one of the greatest roles in our 
government: collecting revenue.58 Such revenue is used to 
finance various governmental functions necessary to protect 
and help run the country.59 The IRS is in turn given great 
powers to fulfill this role.60 As discussed in Part II.A, the IRS 
assumes executive, legislative, and judicial powers in making 
sure that the government receives from taxpayers the tax 
revenue to which it is entitled. The IRS’s primary focus is thus 
on the taxpayer. However, despite having such great powers 
and dealing directly with citizens, the IRS has failed to adhere 
to the APA, which was enacted to avoid this exact situation: 
the accumulation of power in one agency, threatening to 
overlook the interests of the people.61 Part II.A gives a brief 
description of the IRS, along with its current mission, and Part 
II.B explains the IRS’s lack of compliance with the APA. 
A. In General 
The IRS had its beginnings in 1862 when President 
Abraham Lincoln appointed a Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
to collect income taxes to help finance the civil war.62 This tax was 
repealed ten years later, and when Congress tried to reenact it in 
1894, the Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional.63 It 
was not until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 
that the power to collect income taxes was finally approved.64 
Today, personal income taxes generate almost half of the total 
  
 56 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra Part III.B. 
 58 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 59 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 60 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
 61 See supra Part I.B. 
 62 Brief History of IRS, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=149200,00.html 
(last updated Nov. 1, 2007). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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federal revenue.65 Thus, the current focus of the IRS is 
predominantly on individual taxpayers. 
In exercising its power to collect taxes, the IRS assumes 
the roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.66 It 
does this by executing the same laws and policies it 
promulgates.67 Then, in implementing its formulated rules, the 
IRS scrutinizes taxpayers’ filings when it suspects violations of 
those rules, and imposes sanctions accordingly.68 
In keeping with its focus on taxpayers, the current 
mission of the IRS is as follows: “Provide America’s taxpayers 
top-quality service by helping them understand and meet their 
tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and 
fairness to all.”69 Based upon its mission statement, it is clear 
that the IRS wants to assist taxpayers and treat them fairly. 
However, although the IRS strives to be more taxpayer 
friendly, the tax code remains highly complex, which instead 
burdens taxpayers.70 There are many regulations, rulings, 
notices, and other pronouncements that contribute to rule 
complexity and inequity, making the system inefficient and in 
dire need of reform.71 In addition to, and more likely as a result 
of, this complexity and inequity, public opinion of the agency 
remains low.72 
B. The IRS’s Lack of Compliance with the APA 
In a study on the extent of the Treasury’s compliance 
with the APA, Professor Kristin E. Hickman found that the 
Treasury has failed to follow the rulemaking requirements of 
the APA in 40.9% of the total strategically chosen rulemaking 
projects—spanning three years—that she studied.73 She also 
found that in almost 90% of those nonconforming rules, or 
36.2% of all of the projects studied, the “Treasury instead 
issued legally-binding temporary regulations simultaneously 
  
 65 U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2005 TO 2014, at 72 (2004), available at http://www. 
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4985/01-26-BudgetOutlook-EntireReport.pdf. 
 66 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 67 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 68 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 69 IRS Mission Statement and LMSB Vision Statement, IRS.GOV, http://www. 
irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=181225,00.html (last updated June 23, 2010). 
 70 See Edwards, supra note 2.  
 71 See id. 
 72 Boully, supra note 3. 
 73 Hickman, supra note 46, at 1748.  
2011] NO MORE EXCUSES 847 
with the [notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)], requesting 
public comments on the temporary regulations as proposed 
regulations also.”74 This rulemaking process is backwards and 
defeats the purpose of the APA, which is to allow commenting 
and to protect affected parties before a rule becomes binding.75 
She explains that “[t]he typical pattern of these projects 
involves Treasury collecting public comments and evaluating 
them in promulgating the final regulations some months or 
years after issuing the NPRM.”76 The remaining nonconforming 
rules were issued as final regulations without notice-and-
comment altogether.77 
To defend its actions, the Treasury argues that 
interpretive rules are exempt from the provisions of Section 
553(b), (c), and (d), and then posits that most Treasury 
regulations fall under this interpretative rule exception, among 
others.78 However, Professor Hickman concludes in her study 
that the “Treasury’s reliance on the interpretive rule, 
procedural rule, and good cause exemptions of APA section 
553(b) is misplaced.”79 
In general, the interpretive rule exception is 
questionable because “all Treasury regulations are legislative 
rules,” whether promulgated under specific authority or 
general authority.80 It used to be that regulations promulgated 
under general authority did not have the force of law and were 
unequivocally considered to be interpretive, merely explaining 
the meaning of a statute.81 However, that is no longer the case, 
as both general and specific authority regulations carry the 
  
 74 Id.  
 75 See supra Parts I.A-B. 
 76 Hickman, supra note 46, at 1748-49. 
 77 Id. at 1749. 
 78 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.4.4 (2004), available at http://www. 
irs.gov/irm. It is important to note here that although the IRS claims that it is exempt 
from the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the APA, it nonetheless 
conforms to such procedures more often than not. Professor Hickman found that the 
IRS followed the traditional APA rulemaking process in 59.1% of the projects studied. 
Hickman, supra note 46, at 1749 tbl. 1. However, in almost all of the projects studied—
92.70%—Professor Hickman found that the “Treasury claimed explicitly that the 
rulemaking requirements of APA section 553(b) did not apply.” Id. at 1749. And, in 
81.55% of the total, the Treasury did not provide any reason or “basis” for making such 
a “conclusory statement.” Id. 
 79 Hickman, supra note 46, at 1759. 
 80 Id. at 1773. 
 81 Id. 
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force of law by affecting people’s rights and obligations,82 thus 
making them legislative rules by definition.83 As a result, 
subjecting all, or at least most, regulations to notice-and-
comment rulemaking would be in line with the essential 
purpose of the APA, which is to allow taxpayers to place a 
check on an agency that has the potential to abuse its power by 
promulgating binding rules that it simultaneously enforces.84 It 
would be absurd to think that Congress intended to exempt 
rules that altered people’s rights and obligations from 
complying with the APA. The rules that the IRS claims are 
interpretive are in fact legislative because they affect people’s 
rights and obligations. Accordingly, such rules should be 
subject to APA notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to 
ensure people’s rights are not exploited.  
Likewise, the use of the procedural rule exception is 
questionable because the temporary regulations the IRS 
claimed were procedural rules actually “elaborated substantive 
provisions of the [Internal Revenue Code] in substantive ways” 
rather than “merely tweak the way that taxpayers interact 
with the government.”85 As discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, any rule that treads on people’s rights and 
obligations must be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures to ensure that the IRS is not overstepping its 
boundaries and is treating people fairly. The IRS should not be 
allowed to claim exceptions for something that does not fit the 
definition of what qualifies for such exception. The IRS, of all 
agencies, should be very familiar with how narrowly exceptions 
should be applied.86 
And finally, the good cause exception is misplaced. First, 
it fails on procedural grounds because the APA requires that if 
an agency wants to invoke the good cause exception, it must do 
so expressly and “provide ‘a brief statement of reasons’ along 
with the regulations being issued.”87 Second, the good cause 
  
 82 Id.; see also Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory 
Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 393-401 (noting the declining relevance of the specific 
versus general authority distinction). 
 83 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 84 See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text. 
 85 Hickman, supra note 46, at 1777-78. 
 86 When taxpayers claim exemptions on their tax returns, such exemptions 
must adhere to strict definitions set forth by the IRS. Narrow applications of such 
exemptions are in the IRS’s best interests because it wants to allow as few people and 
organizations as possible to not pay taxes. 
 87 Hickman, supra note 46, at 1778 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006)). 
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exception fails on substantive grounds because it is a narrow 
provision meant to provide agencies with “flexibility in dealing 
with emergencies and typographical errors, plus the occasional 
situation in which advance notice would be counterproductive.”88 
In her study, Professor Hickman found that the Treasury did not 
have a valid purpose for invoking this narrow exception, or at 
least that its purposes were questionable.89 
Surely it is more convenient for the IRS to bypass the 
APA’s procedural hurdles. There may even be an argument in 
favor of noncompliance because it allows the Treasury to keep 
up with social and economic events that may be corrected 
through the tax system. However, if we want to maintain the 
integrity of our democratic system of government and protect 
taxpayers’ rights, we must subject the IRS to scrutiny through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
III. WHY THE IRS SHOULD ADHERE TO THE APA 
In addition to the doctrinal flaws in the Treasury’s use 
of the exemptions to Section 553(b), there are more practical 
reasons that warrant the IRS’s compliance with the APA’s 
rulemaking requirements. By complying with the APA, the IRS 
could protect itself against courts striking down its rules for 
failure to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures. This is especially important in the face of a recent 
circuit court decision that might have opened the door to 
judicial review of preenforcement agency action. Additionally, 
the IRS could ensure that the rules are given the utmost 
deference in litigation proceedings involving those rules. 
Furthermore, adhering to the APA would increase taxpayer 
confidence in the system, and would in turn help the IRS 
accomplish its goal of reducing the tax gap. And finally, 
engaging the IRS in the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process would uphold the integrity of the law, along with the 
fundamental principles of separation of powers.  
  
 88 Id. at 1782-86. 
 89 Id.  
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A. Judicial Review 
1. Cohen v. United States and Judicial Review of 
Preenforcement Agency Action 
Cohen v. United States was initiated when “various 
[multidistrict litigation] lawsuits arose challenging the refund 
process” for “[excise] taxes erroneously collected between 
February 28, 2003 and August 1, 2006.”90 The refund process was 
announced in Notice 2006-5091 (“the Notice”) after five circuit 
courts ruled that the tax was invalid.92 The United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the cases, 
holding that the appellants “failed to exhaust their 
administrative remedies for their refund claims and failed to 
state valid claims under federal law, including the APA.”93 The 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal of 
appellants’s APA claims, and affirmed the dismissal of Cohen’s 
refund claim.94 
Generally, when it comes to tax cases, the D.C. Circuit 
has limited jurisdiction:95 it may hear cases involving disputed 
funds only after the petitioner has exhausted the refund 
procedures found in the tax code.96 Otherwise, a party must 
  
 90 Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Pursuant to 26 
U.S.C. § 4252(b), the IRS collects a three percent excise tax on long-distance phone 
calls whose charges “vary with distance and transmission time.” Id. at 3. However, 
when the IRS continued to collect these taxes despite a shift in the telecommunications 
industry practice that led to “many consumers . . . pay[ing] strictly based on 
transmission time” and without reference to distance, taxpayers challenged the tax. Id. 
Five circuit courts sided with the taxpayers and held the tax “inapplicable to long-
distance calls charged without reference to the distance variable.” Id. at 4.  
 91 I.R.S. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141. 
 92 Cohen, 578 F.3d at 4. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. A rehearing en banc had been scheduled for September 29, 2010. Cohen 
v. United States, 599 F.3d 652, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). As of the date of this 
note, the D.C. Circuit had not released an opinion. 
 95 Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only hear “cases 
or controversies involving conflicts that may arise under either the Constitution or 
laws of the federal government.” CANN, supra note 33, at 115. However, Congress may 
allow federal courts appellate jurisdiction, meaning that the courts may review the 
decisions of some lower courts absent a constitutional or federal issue. Id. at 128. 
 96 Cohen, 578 F.3d at 6; see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
  This is called a postenforcement or “enforcement-based” action, meaning that 
the rule has been applied, it adversely affected a party, and that party wants to challenge 
the application of the rule rather than the general “substantive or procedural validity of a 
regulation.” Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1153, 1164 n.46 (2008). Generally, there are two types of post-enforcement actions: 
(1) “refund litigation” where the taxpayer was assessed a deficiency, paid it over to the IRS, 
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have been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute.”97 The circuit court 
viewed Cohen v. United States as that extraordinary tax case 
that fell under its federal question jurisdiction.98 
The issue in the case was the classification of the Notice 
issued by the IRS: whether it was a “substantive rule” or a 
“general statement of policy.”99 As mentioned above, the Notice set 
forth procedures for claiming a refund for the improperly collected 
excise taxes.100 The court, refusing to accept the IRS’s position that 
this Notice was a general statement of policy and thus not subject 
to APA challenges, held that the Notice was indeed subject to 
challenges under the APA.101 It found that the Notice “constituted 
a final agency action that aggrieved taxpayers by hindering their 
access to court” and remanded the case for further consideration 
under the appellants’ APA claims.102 
In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that under the 
APA, “[a] substantive rule constitutes a binding final agency 
action and is reviewable,”103 whereas a general policy statement 
is not.104 It applied a two-prong test for determining whether a 
rule is binding and thus reviewable.105 That test looks to whether 
the rule “(1) marked the ‘consummation’ of the IRS’s decision-
making process and (2) either affects legal ‘rights or obligations’ 
or results in ‘legal consequences.’”106 The court found that the 
Notice at issue met the test because it “operates as a substantive 
rule that binds the IRS, excise tax collectors, and taxpayers,”107 
and it is thus subject to scrutiny under the APA. 
This is the first time the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit has directly scrutinized the substantive and procedural 
aspects of an agency action without a tax refund claim pending 
  
and is seeking a refund; and (2) “deficiency litigation” where a deficiency has been assessed, 
is due, but has not yet been paid over to the IRS. Id. at 1164. 
 97 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 98 Cohen, 578 F.3d at 6 (“[O]nly in the anomalous case where the wrongful 
assessment is not disputed and litigants do not seek a refund is a standalone claim 
under the APA viable. This is that case.”). See id. at 5.  
 99 Id. at 7. 
 100 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
 101 Cohen, 578 F.3d at 12. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 6. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)). 
 107 Id. 
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in the forefront of that action.108 The IRS should heed this 
decision because, historically, other circuits have followed the 
D.C. Circuit when it comes to administrative law issues.109 
Notably, the fact that the court did not find the IRS’s 
characterization of the Notice dispositive should speak volumes 
to the IRS.110 It seems that the court will apply its own 
independent test in determining whether an agency action is 
substantive or whether it is merely interpretive, regardless of 
how the IRS characterizes it. 
Perhaps the IRS will choose to limit this case to its facts 
and refuse to follow it; but the fact remains that the D.C. 
Circuit has opened the door for judicial scrutiny of IRS action 
under the APA without an underlying tax dispute. Likewise, 
even if this holding is vacated upon a rehearing en banc, it is 
important because it shows the D.C. Circuit’s willingness to 
rule in this manner, and other circuits can still look to the 
vacated ruling for guidance.111 Additionally, the law still stands 
that if an agency action is found to be a substantive rather 
than merely interpretive rule, it will be subject to judicial 
review under the APA. Consequently, the Cohen decision 
demonstrates the court’s potential willingness to engage in 
independent analysis of the IRS’s actions without deferring to 
the agency’s characterization of its actions as determinative, 
and its willingness to do so without a tax refund claim pending 
in the forefront of the action. 
Although the court made clear that “this is a post-
enforcement case,”112 it nevertheless hinted that there is 
nothing in the case law to preclude courts from scrutinizing a 
  
 108 The court ruled that the refund claim had not ripened at the time of the 
suit, and so the district court did not err by dismissing the refund claim. Id. at 22. The 
courts of appeals generally review the validity of IRS rules only when there is an 
appeal of a tax dispute. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 109 Paul L. Caron, Hickman: D.C. Circuit Delivers a Doozy, TAX PROF BLOG (Aug. 
8, 2009), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/08/hickman-dc-circuit.html. 
 110 See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 
893 (2004) (“If a purported nonlegislative rule has operative characteristics that only a 
legislative rule can legitimately possess, courts will not hesitate to invalidate that rule 
on the ground that the agency did not use proper procedures to adopt it.”). 
 111 The rehearing was scheduled on the following issues: (1) Whether the 
Administrative Procedure Act claims of the plaintiffs are barred at this time under 28 
U.S.C. § 2201(a) or 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a); (2) Should D.C. Circuit precedent interpreting 
the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act as “coterminous” be 
overruled? (3) If the Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act bars the 
court from hearing plaintiffs’ APA claims, may plaintiffs still challenge IRS Notice 
2006-50 in a refund suit under 26 U.S.C. § 7422? (4) Does APA Section 702 waive 
sovereign immunity for plaintiffs’ APA claims? Cohen, 599 F.3d at 652. 
 112 Cohen, 578 F.3d at 13. 
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preenforcement action: “the dissent similarly cannot point to 
any case that has disallowed a pre-enforcement APA challenge 
in a context like this one.”113 The court even asserted that “[n]o 
agency operates beyond the reach of the law,”114 and made clear 
that “[o]nce the limits of the protections Congress provided 
have been surpassed, . . . the IRS is subject to the same legal 
requirements as other administrative agencies.”115 
In sum, the D.C. Circuit refused to accept the IRS’s 
characterization of the ruling as a general “policy statement” 
and engaged in its own analysis of whether the rule was 
interpretive or legislative.116 This shows that courts will take it 
upon themselves to review agency action and determine 
whether such an action is subject to the APA. And more 
importantly, because members of the court, albeit in dissent, 
pointed out that there is an argument that Cohen is in fact a 
preenforcement action,117 it leaves open the chance for such 
independent judicial scrutiny of preenforcement actions under 
the APA. The following section explains why such a reading of 
the case is plausible. 
2. Policy Reasons for Reading Cohen Broadly to Allow for 
Judicial Review of Preenforcement Agency Action 
There are valid policy reasons for reading Cohen broadly 
and thus implementing preenforcement judicial review of IRS 
action. For one, preenforcement judicial review would 
discourage the IRS from promulgating rules without complying 
with the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements 
by making it clear that all rules and regulations will be subject 
to challenges under the APA whether or not they have been 
enforced. In other words, rules will be subject to judicial review 
immediately after promulgation rather than post-enforcement. 
This will ensure across-the-board compliance with the APA. 
  
 113 Id. The dissent relied on the characterization of the case as a 
preenforcement action, opining that the ripeness doctrine precluded the court from 
hearing the case at that time. Id. at 21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part). 
 114 Id. at 14 (majority opinion). 
 115 Id. (referring to the protections Congress afforded to relieve the IRS from 
some, albeit not all, of the requirements of the APA). 
 116 Id. at 8. 
 117 Id. at 21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (“Until plaintiffs seek a larger 
refund from the IRS and are denied, Notice 2006-50 will not have been enforced 
against them by the IRS. So this lawsuit is a pre-enforcement suit targeting Notice 
2006-50. And the ripeness doctrine, in my judgment, precludes hearing this pre-
enforcement case at this time.”). 
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Similarly, as in Cohen, the mere possibility that a court could 
invalidate a regulation for putting unreasonable restrictions or 
burdens on taxpayers in redeeming refunds might encourage 
the IRS to make sure there are no such hurdles at the outset. 
In addition to deterring the IRS from abusing its power, 
allowing for preenforcement judicial review would foster the 
type of balance that exists between the branches of 
government. Because administrative agencies have been 
deemed the “fourth branch” of government,118 it is appropriate 
to subject them to the same regulatory scheme employed by the 
original three branches in which each one is subject to some 
sort of “check” by the others.119 This judicial “check” on the IRS 
would ultimately bring about a more democratic legislative 
process, as the agency is essentially doing the job of Congress 
in promulgating binding law that affects the rights and 
obligations of citizens.120 As one scholar points out, “there has 
always been in our traditions particular concern with the 
judicial role where governmental interference with the ‘private 
rights’ of ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ was involved.”121 In terms of the 
role of judicial review in the modern administrative state, 
“[Justice] Brandeis . . . asserted that ‘[t]he supremacy of law 
demands that there shall be an opportunity to have some court 
decide whether an erroneous rule was applied.’”122 
Although Congress has implemented various 
exemptions to the IRS’s compliance with various regulatory 
schemes that stand in the way of judicial review,123 Cohen and 
the underlying principles that would support preenforcement 
judicial review of agency action suggest that a shift to greater 
and more aggressive judicial review of IRS rule-making 
procedures might be imminent. As such, it is in the best 
interest of the IRS to begin complying with the APA across the 
board as soon as possible to ensure that its rules will be safe 
from APA challenges in the future. By continuing its practice of 
noncompliance, coupled with questionable explanations for 
  
 118 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 119 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.  
 120 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 121 Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 17 (1983). 
 122 Id. at 19 (citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 
84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (alteration in original). 
 123 See Hickman, supra note 96, at 1162-81 (describing the limitations on 
preenforcement judicial review). 
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exemption,124 the IRS is digging a deeper hole for itself because 
the more rules and regulations it promulgates improperly, the 
harder it will be to clean up the mess once the courts take on 
preenforcement challenges against such improperly enacted 
rules and regulations. 
B. Guarantee Courts’ Deference in Litigation Proceedings 
In addition to guarding itself against preenforcement 
judicial review by complying with the APA’s notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements, compliance with the APA 
will help the IRS become more efficient by guaranteeing that 
judges will defer to its rules and regulations.125 Achieving such 
deference would reduce the time and effort it takes to defend 
the validity of the IRS’s rules and regulations once a case has 
gone to litigation.126 
The state of the law in terms of judicial deference to tax 
regulations, and agency rules in general, is unclear.127 The 
reason for this uncertainty lies in the ever-debated 
legislative/interpretive dichotomy. Traditionally, if a rule was 
legislative, courts honored the agency’s position “unless it was 
in conflict with the statute, or was arbitrary and capricious.”128 
But if the rule was interpretive, courts were free to adopt their 
own interpretation of the statute, giving the rule only 
“respectful consideration.”129 However, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. required courts to 
defer to agency action if they find that that action was 
  
 124 See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.  
 125 See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text. 
 126 For the fiscal year 2009, the IRS chief counsel received 34,478 tax litigation 
cases, closed 35,520 tax litigation cases, and had 32,421 tax litigation cases pending as of 
September 30, 2009. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 61 
(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf. The total amount of 
operating costs incurred by the IRS in 2009 was $11.7 billion. Id. at 66. Of that total, $4.8 
billion was incurred for enforcement activities. Id. at 65. Moreover, because the issue of what 
principles will be used to decide whether deference is owed to IRS regulations has not yet been 
established, the IRS must continue to expend great effort to prove that a regulation should be 
deferred to. See Alan Horowitz, Supreme Court to Address Deference Owed to Regulation 
Governing FICA Taxation of Medical Residents, TAX APPELLATE BLOG (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://appellatetax.com/2010/08/02/supreme-court-to-address-deference-owed-to-regulation-
governing-fica-taxation-of-medical-residents. 
 127 Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in 
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2006). 
 128 John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury 
Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 44 (2003). 
 129 Id. at 45. 
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reasonable,130 regardless whether the rule was deemed 
legislative or interpretive.131 Nevertheless, as will be discussed, 
two other cases, and possibly even a third, have muddied the 
waters. Therefore, it is advisable for the IRS to take a 
conservative approach to its rulemaking authority by ensuring 
that all potentially legislative rules comply with the APA. 
The Chevron standard is very broad: it “requires 
accepting all reasonable agency positions, as opposed to giving 
more or less weight to the agency’s position in the course of 
deciding what is the best interpretation of the statute.”132 
Demonstrably, the Supreme Court has applied Chevron 
deference to legislative and interpretive rules alike,133 straying 
from the traditional legislative/interpretive dichotomy. 
However, in 2000 and 2001 respectively, two Supreme 
Court cases—Christensen v. Harris County134 and United States 
v. Mead Corp.135—reined in the broad reach of the Chevron 
standard. In 2000, Christensen held that “[i]nterpretations 
such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained 
in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant 
Chevron-style deference.”136 It fell short, however, in fully 
defining the limits of Chevron deference because it did not 
specify how a court would go about determining whether a rule 
has the force of law.137 It was not until the following year that 
the Supreme Court in Mead took on the task of defining 
Chevron’s scope. 
In limiting Chevron’s applicability, Mead first rejected 
the presumption in Chevron that every rule promulgated by an 
agency by virtue of its policymaking authority is entitled to 
deference as long as it is reasonable.138 Instead, the Court 
looked to the intent of Congress to determine whether to grant 
Chevron deference.139 To demonstrate that intent, the Court set 
  
 130 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). 
 131 See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 132 Coverdale, supra note 128, at 45. 
 133 Id. at 46 (stating that although most of the regulations deferred to by the 
Supreme Court were issued pursuant to notice-and-comment requirements, “the Court 
applied Chevron to a broad range of agency positions that had not been subject to 
notice and comment”). 
 134 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 135 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 136 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 137 See id. at 587-88. 
 138 Coverdale, supra note 128, at 49.  
 139 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. 
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out two conditions that must be met: (1) “Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law,” and (2) “the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”140 
In setting out those two conditions, “Mead presumes 
that when an agency pronouncement is to have [the force of 
law], Congress wants to insure ‘fairness and deliberation’ 
which ‘relatively formal administrative procedure[s] tend[] to 
foster.’”141 And, although the Court urged that a lack of notice-
and-comment rulemaking is not dispositive of the issue,142 the 
Court’s failure to suggest “indicators”—other than notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication—that show that 
the agency is acting pursuant to Congress’s grant of authority 
in promulgating its rules suggests otherwise.143 Thus, notice-
and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication are 
important indicators that a rule was promulgated under the 
authority to give such rule the force of law, thereby entitling it 
to Chevron deference.144 
Moreover, making formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking one of the conditions of awarding 
Chevron deference to agency pronouncements would be a 
clearer standard and would yield the same results as the Mead 
court’s test.145 It must be recognized that the reason why the 
court did not make notice-and-comment rulemaking the only 
requirement for applying Chevron deference was probably 
because “[m]aking notice and comment a requirement for 
inferring that Congress intends Chevron deference would . . . 
have required the Court to overrule a number of its earlier 
cases.”146 Nevertheless, judging from the Court’s loose 
application of the Mead test to the facts of that case, and its 
inability to cite alternative examples that would indicate that 
Congress granted the agency authority to promulgate binding 
rules, “although unwilling to say so, the Court considers notice-
and-comment rulemaking or adjudication virtually the sin qua 
non of Chevron deference.”147 
  
 140 Id.  
 141 Coverdale, supra note 128, at 50 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 230). 
 142 Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.  
 143 Coverdale, supra note 128, at 51, 54; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31. 
 144 Coverdale, supra note 128, at 51. 
 145 Id. at 52. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
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Given this reading of Mead, it is in the IRS’s best 
interest to fully comply with notice-and-comment 
requirements. Unless the Supreme Court is going to completely 
defer to any reasonable agency action, it is going to look to the 
agency’s delegated authority and the formal administrative 
procedures used in exercising that authority to determine 
whether or not the agency’s actions have infringed on the 
democratic legislative process.148 And from the Mead opinion, it 
is evident that notice-and-comment rulemaking is the most 
concrete indication that Congress granted the agency the 
authority to promulgate rules carrying the force of law.  
Additionally, in 2008 the Third Circuit in Swallows 
Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner149 “provide[d] an unsettling 
reminder of the confusing state of the law concerning when 
courts should defer to federal tax regulations,”150 and further 
confirmed the importance of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements. There, the court reversed the Tax Court and 
upheld the validity of a Treasury regulation that was deemed 
to be interpretive by the Tax Court.151 In reaching its decision, 
the Third Circuit applied Chevron deference without drawing a 
distinction between the legislative or interpretive nature of the 
regulations.152 Instead, it found that Chevron deference was 
applicable because the regulation was opened to public 
comment—“a move that is indicative of agency action that 
carries the force of law.”153 
In utilizing notice-and-comment rulemaking as its basis 
for deference, the circuit court “set[] the stage for the level of 
judicial deference to be decided based on whether the IRS 
complies with the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”154 This, however, raises the issue of what level 
of deference will be given to regulations that are purported to 
carry the force of law but were not promulgated under the 
formal rulemaking requirements of the APA.155 
  
 148 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-30. 
 149 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 150 Eve Elgin, Swallows Decision Renews Questions About Judicial Deference to 
Tax Regs, THE TAX ADVISOR, June 1, 2008, available at http://www.aicpa.org/Publications/ 
TaxAdviser/2008/jun/Pages/SwallowsDecisionRenewsQuestionsAboutJudicialDeferenceto 
TaxRegs.aspx?. 
 151 Swallows Holding, 515 F.3d at 164. 
 152 Id. at 169. 
 153 Id. at 169-70. 
 154 Elgin, supra note 150. 
 155 Id. 
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In sum, it is unclear whether legislative regulations will 
receive Chevron deference while interpretive regulations will 
not. Nor is it clear that notice-and-comment rulemaking is the 
sole indicator of an action that carries the force of law. What is 
clear is that, either way, it is best for the IRS to move away 
from its characterization of regulations and rulings as 
interpretive and to begin complying with the APA across the 
board. Even if courts do not base their decisions on the 
legislative/interpretive dichotomy, which would favor the IRS’s 
position by allowing interpretive regulations to receive 
deference, courts will nonetheless place great emphasis on 
whether the rule was promulgated using the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirements. And since many rules promulgated by 
the IRS fail to conform to APA rulemaking requirements,156 it 
leaves these rules open to challenges, meaning that the IRS 
will need to expend extra resources to prove to courts that their 
rules and regulations are valid. Consequently, if the IRS 
continues its noncompliance with the APA, it will delay 
litigation by taking the focus off the merits of the case, increase 
the agency’s litigation costs, and ultimately undercut the 
efficiency of its enforcement procedures. 
C. Increase Taxpayer Confidence and Help Close the Tax Gap 
Because the majority of tax revenue is generated by the 
individual income tax, the IRS’s focus has shifted to the 
taxpayer.157 Its current mission to support and protect 
taxpayers in the taxing process evidences this fact.158 
Additionally, the IRS has not lost sight of its primary goal: 
collection of every dollar of tax revenue it is entitled to under 
the law.159 Thus, in addition to its mission, the IRS has put 
forth goals for reducing the tax gap, which is a problem that 
has created a deficiency of approximately $290 billion in 
expected revenues.160 The tax gap consists of underreporting, 
underpayment, and nonfiling.161 Underreporting makes up over 
fifty percent of the total tax gap. And, more importantly, the 
  
 156 See supra Part II.B. 
 157 See supra Part II.A. 
 158 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 159 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
 160 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND 
IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf. 
 161 Id. at 2-3. 
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individual income tax is the “single largest sub-component of 
underreporting.”162 Consequently, the report places great 
emphasis on taxpayer assistance as well: “The Administration 
recognizes the particular value of those efforts and initiatives 
that improve voluntary compliance by making the tax filing 
process easier and more taxpayer-friendly,” which is also in 
line with the overall mission of the IRS.163 
In setting forth this key goal, the IRS conceded the 
complexity of the tax code, and reiterated the fact that 
“effective taxpayer assistance is necessary to help taxpayers 
understand and comply with their obligations.”164 Moreover, the 
IRS emphasized the importance of “simple, clear 
communication” to make compliance easier for taxpayers.165 
Certainly, the issuance of various guiding documents such as 
regulations, revenue rulings, and notices—some binding, some 
not—does not help promote simplicity, since it is unlikely that 
the average taxpayer would have the time and resources to 
understand the documents and how they apply. This 
strengthens the case for full compliance with the APA, which 
would allow a clear distinction to be made between the various 
guidance documents that are binding and carry the force of 
law, and those that are not and are hence merely interpretive. 
Part of the IRS’s current plan in reforming and 
simplifying the tax law is working with Congress “to enact 
simplification legislative provisions.”166 Certainly, this will help 
alleviate the confusion created by the various interpretive 
regulations and rulings; but quite frankly, it will take a long 
time to reenact every obscure tax law since Congress’s capacity 
to enact laws greatly trails that of federal agencies.167 
Admittedly, it would be ideal for Congress to enact any 
potential simplification legislation, as this would be consistent 
with our traditional sense of democracy, in which we elect 
representatives to be our voice in creating laws and policies.168 
However, living in a postindustrial society, as we do today, 
where there are more problems to deal with and where those 
  
 162 Id. at 3. 
 163 Id. at 2. 
 164 Id. at 21. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 25. 
 167 Congress has averaged 288 public laws per year from 1975 to 1996, while 
administrative agencies approve nearly 4000 per year. CANN, supra note 33, at 19.  
 168 Id. at 7. 
2011] NO MORE EXCUSES 861 
problems are increasingly complex,169 it is more efficient to have 
an administrative agency like the Department of the Treasury 
assume the task of setting policy and ironing out the 
ambiguities in the law.170 After all, that is the underlying 
reason for the creation of “the administrative state.”171 However, 
because such efficiency comes with a price—namely, the 
potential for overreaching—agencies should be regulated in 
order to maintain fairness and ensure that the simplification 
process is democratic.172 
Thus, since it will be difficult and time-consuming for 
the IRS to simplify its tax laws by working with Congress to 
enact simplification legislation, and since the alternative route 
is agency rulemaking, which, if unbridled, has much potential 
for abuse and overreaching, the IRS should comply with the 
APA in lieu of working directly with Congress. Compliance 
with the APA will eliminate the inherent problems of a “fourth 
branch of government” and ensure fairness and 
accountability.173 This will allow the IRS to achieve its goal of 
closing the tax gap more efficiently without undermining its 
mission of taxpayer assistance and fairness to all.174 
D. Uphold the Integrity of the Rule of Law 
Our democratic form of government is predicated upon 
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. 
The system of checks and balances was established to place a 
check on each branch of government and prevent any one 
branch from overpowering the other branches.175 
  
 169 Id. at 9 (pointing out that with industrialization came urbanization, which 
“exacerbate[d] problems such as poverty, poor housing, poor health, crime, hunger, 
malnutrition, sewage disposal, and alienation,” and that limited government “is not an 
instrument for dealing with such problems”). Additionally, because of industrialization, 
society began to demand that government step in to regulate the economy and people’s 
lives because of the idea that “some individuals cannot achieve their fullest potential 
without help and that help generally will come from government.” Id. at 10. As a 
result, government was called on to regulate things such as child labor, child 
education, food, and monopolies, to name just a few. Id. 
 170 Id. at 10-11. 
 171 Id. “The administrative state” is an expression used to describe “[t]he 
notion of policy making by agencies and bureaucracies rather than by popularly elected 
(and accountable) representatives.” Id. at 8. It is also known as “the fourth branch of 
government.” Id. 
 172 See supra Part II.A. 
 173 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 174 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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Whether the IRS is promulgating a rule or making a 
procedural change within the organization itself, public 
information is essential to maintaining checks and balances in 
our government.176 When the growth of the administrative state 
began to threaten this system, Congress decided it was 
necessary to employ an external device to place a check on the 
agencies.177 This led to the passage of the APA.178 
Additionally, because there is no equivalent of a 
legislature within the agencies to represent the will of the 
people like in Congress, public information and notice-and-
comment rulemaking have to take its place.179 As expressed in 
the APA’s legislative history, “[t]he public information 
requirements . . . are in many ways among the most important, 
far-reaching, and useful provisions of the bill.”180 “[They] 
require[] that agencies state their organizational set-ups, 
promulgate statements respecting their procedures, and make 
available as regulations the substantive and interpretive rules 
which they have framed for the guidance of the public.”181 
The government obtains its power from the people,182 
and so it must answer to the public when making laws that 
affect their rights and liabilities.183 The people delegated to the 
government the power to make choices on their behalf, but only 
under the condition that their interests would be protected.184 
Thus, when a government agency has no check on its power, 
and may assume the role of either the legislative, executive, or 
judicial branch without restraint, the people must be informed 
and be given an opportunity to express their concerns and 
ensure that their interests are being protected.185 Complying 
with the APA accomplishes this need and provides for a more 
  
 176 APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 198. 
 177 See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 271.  
 178 Id. 
 179 See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 
370, 386 (1932) (emphasizing that when Congress delegates its lawmaking power to an 
agency, that agency “speaks as the legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of 
a statute”). However, despite assuming the legislature’s role, there are no specially 
elected representatives who will represent the will of the people. See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
 180 APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 198. 
 181 Id. at 353. 
 182 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”). 
 183 See Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 809, 814 (1999).  
 184 Id.  
 185 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
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legitimate rulemaking process.186 By complying with the APA, 
an agency shows respect for the public and demonstrates that 
it is concerned with protecting the public’s interests. This 
undoubtedly increases people’s confidence in that agency. 
Additionally, notice-and-comment rulemaking makes it 
more likely that an agency will “apply the law evenhandedly, 
rather than engage in ad hoc decisionmaking.”187 By publicizing 
a proposed rule and accepting input from the public before 
promulgating the final product, the agency ensures that 
narrow interests are not favored at the expense of the general 
public’s interests, and it also creates consistency in the law.188 
Furthermore, if an agency seeks to enact a binding rule that 
will have the full force of law, then it must employ procedures 
that mirror those of the traditional legislative process.189 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The IRS is one of the most powerful agencies in our 
government, and it serves one of the most important functions 
therein—a function upon which all other functions of government 
rely: collection of revenue through taxation. However, with such 
great power comes the potential for abuse and overreaching. That 
is not to say that the IRS engages in such abuse of power, but the 
combination of complexity in the tax code and the IRS’s lack of 
compliance with the APA in promulgating rules have contributed 
to the IRS’s tarnished image. 
With today’s increasing national debt,190 it is even more 
critical than before that the IRS operate efficiently and 
successfully in collecting all the tax revenue it is entitled to 
under the tax laws. Because it is inadvisable to impose new 
taxes on individuals during a recession, it is important to use 
current tax laws to collect as much money as possible.191 
  
 186 Asimow, supra note 82, at 402 (“The APA notice and comment procedure 
infuses the rulemaking process with significant elements of openness, accountability, 
and legitimacy.”). 
 187 Manning, supra note 110, at 905.  
 188 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 539 (2003). 
 189 Id. (“The law-like decisionmaking requirement ensures that when agencies 
claim the force of law, they actually have made law.”). 
 190 See generally Brian M. Riedl, The Obama Budget: Spending, Taxes, and 
Doubling the National Debt, BACKGROUNDER (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.heritage. 
org/Research/budget/bg2249.cfm. 
 191 See id. at 7 (“While there is never a good time to raise taxes, President 
Obama’s proposal to raise taxes during a recession is especially problematic.”). 
864 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
Consequently, it is important for the IRS to ensure that those 
rules it wants to operate with the force of law actually do so, so 
as to improve the IRS’s efficiency and lower the costs of 
litigation proceedings when rules are challenged. This is 
particularly important because of the implications for the IRS 
of the recently decided D.C. Circuit case, Cohen v. United 
States, and because of the lack of certainty in the law 
governing judicial deference to administrative agencies. 
By complying with the APA, the IRS will protect itself 
against the risk that courts will scrutinize rules 
preenforcement rather than postenforcement; ensure deference 
in litigation proceedings, thereby creating efficiency and 
cutting costs; achieve its goal in reducing the tax gap; and 
maintain integrity of the law by supporting a democratic 
legislative process, thereby protecting taxpayer interests and 
increasing their confidence in the system. 
It is not certain that courts will embrace the practice of 
reviewing agency actions under the APA without there being a 
tax dispute in the forefront of the matter. However, provided 
that there is an argument to be made, along with supporting 
policy reasons, that Cohen v. United States should be read 
expansively to allow for preenforcement judicial review, it is in 
the IRS’s best interests to fully comply with the APA in order to 
protect itself in the event that courts continue to shift focus. 
Additionally, it would be wise for the IRS to begin complying 
with the APA as soon as possible so that if courts do decide to go 
in the direction of preenforcement judicial review,192 the IRS will 
not have to expend money and other resources to go back and 
make sure that rules that were not promulgated under notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures adhere to such procedures. 
When it comes to the issue of deference the courts give 
to agency rules, the only thing that is certain is that the law in 
this area is uncertain. From the broad Chevron deference to its 
restricting successor cases, courts are not settled upon a clear 
standard for determining when to defer to an administrative 
rule.193 However, an important development has materialized: 
engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking is a good 
indication that a rule was promulgated under the authority 
from Congress necessary to make the rule operate with the 
  
 192 Even if courts do not adopt preenforcement judicial review now, it is likely 
that they will sometime in the near future since the APA is such an important check on 
agency power, and hence needs to be enforced. 
 193 See supra Part III.B. 
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force of law.194 Thus, the safe bet for the IRS is to comply with 
notice-and-comment rulemaking across the board for all rules 
it wishes to have the force of law.  
Even more important in making the case for the IRS’s 
full compliance with the APA is that such compliance will 
provide accountability and transparency in the government. 
People are generally distrustful of government195—they 
condemn the accumulation of too much power in one 
organization.196 People want to ensure that their interests are 
protected when the government acts.197 Full compliance with 
the APA would engage the public in the rulemaking process, 
put taxpayers on notice of the potential rules that might bind 
them in the future, and give them a voice in the matter to 
ensure that those rules are fair and that the IRS is not 
overstepping its bounds. 
It may be that the IRS does not promulgate all of its 
rules using APA rulemaking procedures because the process is 
time-consuming and can be costly; however, at the same time, 
the value of maintaining a democratic legislative system must 
be recognized as well.198 The IRS does not have to promulgate all 
  
 194 Agencies obtain their lawmaking powers from Congress. Congress 
delegates such authority by passing statutes authorizing agencies to act; thus, in order 
for the agency’s rules to carry the force of law, they must comply with those statutes. 
See Manning, supra note 110, at 898.  
 195 PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: DISTRUST, 
DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR 18 (2010), http://people-press.org/reports/ 
pdf/606.pdf (showing that the average trust in government has ranged from 22% to 
42% since the 1960s without ever reaching the 68% figure it reached during the 
Kennedy administration and demonstrating that since that time less than 50% of 
people trust the government). 
 196 Id. at 8 (“The size and power of the federal government also engender 
considerable concern. A 52% majority says it is a major problem that the government is 
too big and powerful, while 58% say that the federal government is interfering too 
much in state and local matters.”). 
 197 See id. at 43 (“Large majorities across partisan lines see elected officials as 
not careful with the government’s money, influenced by special interest money, overly 
concerned about their own careers, unwilling to compromise and out of touch with 
regular Americans.”). 
 198 See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference to the United 
States, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,102 (July 8, 1992) (“The Conference has long advocated 
the value of notice and comment in rulemaking, and this recommendation encourages 
agencies to use such processes voluntarily in promulgating rules of procedure or 
practice. Notice and comment can provide the agency with valuable input from the 
public as well as furnish enhanced public acceptance of the rules. On the other hand, 
there can be costs to the agency in using notice-and-comment procedures, including the 
time and effort of agency personnel, the cost of Federal Register publication, and the 
additional delay in implementation that results from seeking public comments and 
responding to them. For significant procedural rule changes, the benefits seem likely to 
outweigh the costs; but this may not be the case for minor procedural amendments. 
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of its rules using notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, 
but it should at least take a more conscious and systematic 
approach to promulgating rules that will affect the future 
conduct of taxpayers to ensure that the taxpayers’ interests are 
protected and that the integrity of the law is upheld. 
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Thus, unless the costs outweigh the benefits, we strongly encourage agencies 
voluntarily to use notice and comment even where an APA exemption applies.”). 
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